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HOW STATE COURTS CAN HELP AMERICA RECOVER THE 
RULE OF LAW: THE PENNSYLVANIA EXPERIENCE 
Bruce Ledewitz* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Just before Thanksgiving, a jurisprudentially revealing and widely 
publicized debate about whether America has a rule of law took place 
between the President of the United States and the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court.1  President Donald Trump criticized a judicial 
decision that went against his Administration as having been 
rendered by an “Obama judge.”2  Chief Justice John Roberts 
responded that “we do not have Obama judges or Trump judges.”3  
The Chief Justice was defending judicial independence as a necessary 
aspect of the rule of law.4 
But, instead of coming to his defense, most observers, on both sides 
of the political aisle, seemed to agree with President Trump.5  Senate 
Minority Leader Chuck Schumer referred to the Chief Justice as a 
“Republican[],” thus illustrating President Trump’s point about 
partisan judging.6  Randy Barnett, probably the leading conservative 
legal theorist in America, tweeted, “If you don’t think presidents of 
each party (try to) select judges with differing judicial philosophies, 
 
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law and Director of the Duquesne Law 
School Pennsylvania Constitution Website.    
1 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, John Roberts, Leader of Supreme Court’s Conservative Majority, 




4 See Bruce Ledewitz, The Obama Judge and the Foundations of the Rule of Law, JURIST 
(Dec. 2, 2018), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2018/12/the-obama-judge-and-the-foundatio 
ns-of-the-rule-of-law/. 
5 See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 1. 
6 See Chuck Schumer (@SenSchumer), TWITTER (Nov. 23, 2018, 6:51 AM), https://twitter
.com/SenSchumer/status/1065981195148804096. 
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you haven’t been paying attention.  Roosevelt surely did.  And he 
wasn’t the first nor the last.  The argumentation on this one is truly 
bizarre.”7 
Somehow, without most of us noticing, the idea of a rule of law has 
become intellectually implausible and politically indefensible.  Most 
of us now seem to believe that the ideology of the judge is all 
important.8  The implications of this change are dire. 
There is a great deal of philosophically oriented literature about 
objectivity and the rule of law in this post-modern age, including 
Steve Smith’s classic work, Law’s Quandry.9  It is not my intention 
here to repeat in any detail arguments that nihilism, by which I mean 
in this context, skepticism about the objectivity of values, has 
undermined the rule of law.  Suffice it to say that for a classically 
oriented jurist like Justice John Harlan, legal decisions were 
understood to reflect a “rational continuum.”10  If rationality, instead, 
is just a front for power and political commitment, law as it was 
understood in our tradition is not possible. 
Rather, my purpose is to begin to answer a question about how to 
go forward—“can a commitment to Truth be reintroduced in 
American law schools, and how, and when?”11  The answer I propose 
is that truth can be reintroduced in law by attending to the healthy 
values discourse that still goes on in at least some state constitutional 
decision-making.  I will illustrate that proposal by contrasting U.S. 
Supreme Court value skepticism with reasoned values engagement 
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  Of course, I will only highlight 
a very few instances of what I call the absence of the fear of 
subjectivity in the Pennsylvania tradition, but they are contexts in 
 
7 See Ledewitz, supra note 4.  I am in a sense here invoking Randy Barnett against himself.  
In his excellent book, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law (1998), Barnett 
makes the point better than I that a rule of law depends on judgments about the nature of the 
universe and of human beings that are not a matter of human will.  See RANDY E. BARNETT, 
THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 47 (1998).  Barnett’s book is 
absolutely an example of reasoning about values that refutes the value skepticism illustrated 
by Justice Scalia infra.  That is why it was so disappointing that Barnett joined the chorus 
against the Chief Justice.  In the earlier Barnett view, there are not judges with different 
philosophies.  There are sound judges, and decisions, and unsound judges and opinions.  
“Sound” here meaning in accord with the kind of beings we are, the kind of society that 
promotes happiness and the kind of universe we live in.  Partisan appointment has nothing to 
do with it. 
8 See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 1. 
9 See STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY 2 (2004). 
10 This phrase originated in Justice Harlan’s dissent from the dismissal of appeals in Poe v. 
Ullman.  See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“‘[L]iberty’ 
[guaranteed by the due process clause] is not a series of isolated points . . . [but] a rational 
continuum.”). 
11 See Ledewitz, supra note 4. 
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which similar judgments on the U.S. Supreme Court probably would 
bring forth such concerns. 
I have not done the research to establish that Pennsylvania is 
representative of the nation in regard to values engagement, but my 
impression is that this is the case.  State constitutional law seems 
simply healthier today than is the federal tradition. 
In order for state courts to serve as an antidote to nihilism, it is 
also necessary to address the question of why state constitutional 
discourse is better able to engage in reasoned discourse about 
values.12  Ironically, the suggestion raised in the final section of this 
Article is that it is the more political nature of state courts that 
permits state judges to be open about their values.  That is to say, the 
problem of nihilism is not that there are Obama judges and Trump 
judges and is not that judges have different judicial philosophies.  
The problem of nihilism is the fatalism that describes this situation 
as fixed.13  Since under skepticism there is no truth to discover, there 
is no possibility of persuasion and change.14  We simply remain 
forever locked in our contrary positions. 
What is needed, instead, is for judges to have an open conversation 
about values among themselves and with the people, so that 
democratic judgments can be rendered and law can advance.15  That 
is how a rule of law works in a democratic society.16  That process is 
being choked by a nihilism that paralyses national debate.17  But that 
engagement still goes on at the state level.18 
 
12 See infra Part IV. 
13 See Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 
YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1984). 
14 See Bruce Ledewitz, The Five Days in June When Values Died in American Law, 49 AKRON 
L. REV. 115, 146 (2016) [hereinafter Ledewitz, When Values Died in American Law]; Peter S. 
Smith, Note, The Demise of Three-Tier Review: Has the United States Supreme Court Adopted 
a “Sliding Scale” Approach Toward Equal Protection Jurisprudence?, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 475, 
508 (1997). 
15 This is the image of the Supreme Court as conducting a “national seminar” in Eugene 
Rostow’s memorable image, now absolutely out of fashion, since there is nothing to learn under 
nihilism.  See Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 208 (1952).  Barry Friedman would later use the term dialogue to describe the actual 
practice of judicial review.  See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 577, 580–81, 653–54 (1993).  These images require the possibility of emerging consensus 
about constitutional meaning among all constitutional actors.  Obviously, frozen opposing blocs 
on the Supreme Court rooted on by frozen opposing blocs in the nation is a very different 
context. 
16 See Friedman, supra note 15, at 653–54. 
17 Cf. Robert S. Pritchard & Vincent F. Filak, Confronting Media Nihilism: How 
Transparency Builds Meaning During Crises, PUB. REL. J., Winter 2010, at 1, 4 (“Nihilism 
creates a distortion of both reality and society’s awareness of the critical issues relevant to a 
crisis.”). 
18 See infra Part IV. 
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II.  THE NIHILISM OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
One illustration will suffice to demonstrate the value skepticism of 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions—though the reader is free to consult a 
series of articles in which I have endeavored to make this case more 
generally.19  In McDonald v. City of Chicago,20 in a five to four 
decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment’s 
protection of the right to bear arms is fully applicable to the states.21  
In the course of that decision, the five Justice majority held that the 
right to bear arms is “fundamental.”22 
In dissent, Justice Stevens disputed this conclusion: 
 
I do not doubt for a moment that many Americans feel deeply 
passionate about firearms, and see them as critical to their 
way of life as well as to their security.  Nevertheless, it does 
not appear to be the case that the ability to own a handgun, 
or any particular type of firearm, is critical to leading a life of 
autonomy, dignity, or political equality . . . .23 
 
Justice Scalia responded to this assertion with what can only be 
called, in a reference to the famous and despairing statement by 
Arthur Leff, as “the Grand Sez Who:”24  “Who says?  Deciding what 
 
19 See generally Bruce Ledewitz, Has Nihilism Politicized the Supreme Court Nomination 
Process?, 32 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1, 42–43 (2017) [hereinafter Ledewitz, Supreme Court 
Nomination Process] (discussing value judgments in U.S. Supreme Court decisions); Ledewitz, 
When Values Died in American Law, supra note 14, at 115–16 (arguing that Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion in Lee v. Weisman and Justice Scalia’s dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
are emblematic of the nihilism that currently pervades America’s legal culture).  This piece can 
be understood as a companion to The Role of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools in the Renewal 
of American Democracy.  See Bruce Ledewitz, The Role of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools in 
the Renewal of American Democracy, 12 U. MASS. L. REV. 230 (2017) [hereinafter Ledewitz, 
Religiously Affiliated Law Schools].  In that article, I suggest that values discourse in the legal 
academy might be renewed through emulation of religiously affiliated law schools.  Id. at 259.  
Here I suggest that values discourse in judicial opinions might be renewed through attention 
to state constitutional law jurisprudence. 
20 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
21 See id. at 748–49, 791, 806 (concluding, in an opinion by Justice Alito and joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Scalia, that the Second Amendment is incorporated 
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice Thomas, concurring in the 
judgment, concluded that the right is a privilege of American citizenship recognized by the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
22 See id. at 778, 791. 
23 Id. at 893 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
24 This was how Leff ended his article, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law: 
 
 All I can say is this: it looks as if we are all we have.  Given what we know about 
ourselves and each other, this is an extraordinarily unappetizing prospect; looking around 
HOW STATE COURTS CAN HELP 9/17/2019  12:56 PM 
2018/2019] How State Courts Can Help 1329 
is essential to an enlightened, liberty-filled life is an inherently 
political, moral judgment––the antithesis of an objective approach 
that reaches conclusions by applying neutral rules to verifiable 
evidence.”25  Just to make it clear that he is not objecting to the 
particular grounds that Justice Stevens raises to support his claim, 
Justice Scalia goes on to contrast “vague ethico-political First 
Principles” with “historical methodology,” which, because it does not 
reason from first principles, but relies on verifiable evidence, “is 
much less subjective.”26 
I believe it is a fair summary of Justice Scalia’s position to say that 
there can be no reasoning about politics or morality because 
judgments in these fields are inherently subjective.  Despite his 
application of this conclusion against Justice Stevens in McDonald, 
Justice Stevens himself had earlier joined an opinion in which values 
were described as mere human constructs.27  So, I am not here 
highlighting or criticizing this position as in any way unique to 
Justice Scalia.  As was usually the case in his lifetime, Justice Scalia 
is simply sharper and clearer in his enunciation of his position than 
is any other Justice.28  All the Justices are subject to value 
skepticism. 
It is easy to show that value skepticism like this is illogical and 
self-refuting.  After all, the claim that judicial subjectivity is a threat 
to democracy, which Justice Scalia makes repeatedly, is itself nothing 
more than a “political, moral judgment” founded on First Principles 
 
the world, it appears that if all men are brothers, the ruling model is Cain and Abel.  
Neither reason, nor love, nor even terror, seems to have worked to make us “good,” and 
worse than that, there is no reason why anything should.  Only if ethics were something 
unspeakable by us, could law be unnatural, and therefore unchallengeable.  As things now 
stand, everything is up for grabs. 
Nevertheless: 
Napalming babies is bad. 
Starving the poor is wicked. 
Buying and selling each other is depraved. 
Those who stood up to and died resisting Hitler, Stalin, Amin, and 
Pol Pot—and General Custer too—have earned salvation. 
Those who acquiesced deserve to be damned. 
There is in the world such a thing as evil. 
[All together now:] Sez who? 
God help us. 
 
Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1249. 
25 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 800 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
26 Id. at 803–04. 
27 See Ledewitz, When Values Died in American Law, supra note 14, at 117–19. 
28 See, e.g., McDonald, 561 U.S. at 804 (Scalia, J., concurring); Ledewitz, When Values Died 
in American Law, supra note 14, at 119–21. 
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as is the further claim that judges should be faithful to the 
Constitution.29  Who says? 
Justice Scalia held to these positions because he believed them to 
be in some sense true.30  He undoubtedly had reasons for believing 
these things that he thought were rational and based on First 
Principles.31  Presumably, he did not consider those commitments to 
be merely subjective. 
Unfortunately, the rule of law itself is another one of those 
“political, moral judgments” that are merely subjective under the 
reign of skepticism.  The rule of law cannot be protected by resort to 
history or tradition because in Justice Scalia’s skeptical formulation, 
those limits are merely prudential posits—mere mechanisms to 
restrain judicial subjectivity.32  There can be no reason given to want 
to limit judicial subjectivity.  Since reason is said to play no role, 
cannot, in fact, play a role in political or moral judgment,33 these 
limits themselves cannot be defended rationally. 
Believing this, as unfortunately we do, of course we just have 
Obama judges and Trump judges.  We just have judges who come to 
different decisions—what Barnett calls having different judicial 
philosophies.34  However, the word philosophy is misplaced in this 
skeptical context.  One cannot give good reasons for having one 
philosophy or another because reason has nothing to do with it.  We 
just believe what we believe.  Further, politicians should expect 
continuing loyalty to these judicial positions by the judges they 
confirm to the federal courts.  There should never be any change or 
growth or new understanding.  That is why there is such a current 
mania to confirm as many conservative judges as possible to create 
lasting conservative control of the federal courts.35  That is why 
Democrats are so anxious to “take back” the Supreme Court.36  Under 
 
29 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 803–04 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 908 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Ledewitz, Supreme Court Nomination Process, supra note 19, at 17. 
30 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 804 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
31 See id. 
32 See id. at 803–04. 
33 See Ledewitz, Supreme Court Nomination Process, supra note 19, at 1–2. 
34 See Randy E. Barnett, Judicial Conservatism v. A Principled Judicial Activism: Foreword 
to the “Symposium on Law and Philosophy,” 10 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 275–76 (1987). 
35 See Ledewitz, Supreme Court Nomination Process, supra note 19, at 1–2.  See also 
Ledewitz, supra note 4 (“Consider the words of, and the response to, Senate Majority Leader 
Mitch McConnell at the 2018 Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention on November 
15: The closest thing we can do to have a permanent impact is to confirm judges and transform 
the judiciary.  [A]nd we are going to keep on doing it for as long as we can.”). 
36 See Ledewitz, Supreme Court Nomination Process, supra note 19, at 1; Emily Jashinsky, 
Democrats Don’t Want to Confirm Anyone to the Supreme Court Until After 2020 Election, 
WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/democrats-
HOW STATE COURTS CAN HELP 9/17/2019  12:56 PM 
2018/2019] How State Courts Can Help 1331 
value skepticism, changing one’s mind is always betrayal because 
there could, by definition, be no good reason to do so.37 
III.  VALUES IN PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Value skepticism of the type illustrated by Justice Scalia above is 
not wholly absent in Pennsylvania constitutional law, as I will 
elaborate below.  After all, nihilism is a culture-wide phenomenon.38  
The point of the contrast between federal and state constitutional law 
is simply that at the federal level, skepticism is all-consuming.39  It 
is a potential rejoinder to any invocation of values.  That is not merely 
a possibility.  The criticism of a judgment as merely subjective is often 
actually raised at the federal level.40  That is not so in the 
Pennsylvania state courts.41 
A case that illustrates very well the confidence of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in making what might be called common sense, value 
laden judgments is the unanimous opinion in Commonwealth v. 
Eisenberg, in which the court struck down a mandatory $75,000 fine 
as excessive under the State Excessive Fines provision.42 
Chief Justice Castille’s opinion for the court demonstrates 
awareness of the vicissitudes and judicial reluctance of federal 
Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis.43  As Barry Johnson 
has noted, the U.S. Supreme Court has feared resting proportionality 
analysis on “inherently subjective comparisons of sentence severity 
with offense seriousness.”44  But the Eisenberg opinion demonstrates 
no such hesitancy.45 
 
dont-want-to-confirm-anyone-to-the-supreme-court-until-after-2020-election. 
37 See, e.g., Ledewitz, When Values Died in American Law, supra note 14, at 146; Smith, 
supra note 14, at 508. 
38 See Ledewitz, When Values Died in American Law, supra note 14, at 116, 124, 127; 
Ledewitz, Supreme Court Nomination Process, supra note 19, at 1–2. 
39 See Ledewitz, When Values Died in American Law, supra note 14, at 116–20. 
40 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 804 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 
908–09 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
41 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1285 (Pa. 2014); Commonwealth v. 
Miller, 819 A.2d 504, 515 (Pa. 2002) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bricker, 581 A.2d 147, 155 (Pa. 
1990)); Miller, 819 A.2d at 521 (Nigro, J., dissenting) (quoting Bricker, 581 A.2d at 155). 
42 PA CONST. art. I, § 13 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel punishments inflicted.”); Eisenberg, 98 A.3d at 1270. 
43 See Eisenberg, 98 A.3d at 1282 n.18 (noting the rejection by Justice Scalia of any 
proportionality principle and the controlling view of Justice Kennedy that any such analysis 
should be limited to the rare case). 
44 See Barry L. Johnson, Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Excessive Fines 
Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture After United States v. Bajakajian, 
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 461, 504 (2000). 
45 See Eisenberg, 98 A.3d at 1285, 1287. 
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Partly, the reason for this could be said to be the sheer absurdity 
of the statute given the circumstances of the case, in which a low level 
employee of a casino had stolen $200, a misdemeanor theft, for which 
probation was imposed as the sentence, apart from the mandatory 
fine.46  Further, the General Assembly had originally attached this 
level of mandatory fine to acts closely connected to the integrity of 
the gaming industry.47  In a latter amendment, four additional 
criminal acts were added to the mandatory fine section, three of 
which were subject to fines of $200-$1,000 for first time offenders.48  
Only the theft provision at issue in Eisenberg was subject to the 
$75,000 mandatory fine and no legislative findings or purpose 
accompanied the addition.49 
The court’s reasoning was certainly straightforward: 
 
In our view, the fine here, when measured against the conduct 
triggering the punishment, and the lack of discretion afforded 
the trial court, is constitutionally excessive.  Simply put, 
appellant, who had no prior record, stole $200 from his 
employer, which happened to be a casino.  There was no 
violence involved; there was apparently no grand scheme 
involved to defraud either the casino or its patrons.  Employee 
thefts are unfortunately common; as noted, appellant’s 
conduct, if charged under the Crimes Code, exposed him to a 
maximum possible fine of $10,000.  Instead, because 
appellant’s theft occurred at a casino, the trial court had no 
discretion, under the Gaming Act, but to impose a minimum 
fine of $75,000—an amount that was 375 times the amount of 
the theft.50 
 
What is noteworthy about this language is the absence of hand-
wringing about the subjectivity of these factors.  Chief Justice 
Castille seems to be saying that anyone should be able to see that 
this punishment is unjust not only in terms of common sense, but in 
terms of what is usually imposed for conduct of this kind—in the non-
casino context.51  Nor was there any dissent criticizing, or 
concurrence attempting to justify, this second-guessing of the 
 
46 See id. at 1271, 1285. 
47 See id. at 1286. 
48 See id. at 1284. 
49 See id. at 1284, 1286. 
50 Id. at 1285. 
51 See id. 
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legislature.52 
I am not suggesting that the U.S. Supreme Court could not have 
reached this same conclusion under the Eighth Amendment or that 
the outcome in Eisenberg is necessarily correct—though I certainly 
believe that to be so.  I am highlighting here only a difference in tone.  
The fear of subjectivity is simply absent in Eisenberg. 
A similar absence of concern about subjectivity of values can be 
seen in formulations expressing due process concerns, whether of the 
procedural or substantive variety.53  At the federal level, in 1952, 
Justice Frankfurter famously stated in Rochin v. California, that 
“[t]his is conduct that shocks the conscience” in condemning the use 
by police of forcible stomach pumping to seize drugs.54  Even at that 
time, Justice Black, in the midst of the ongoing dispute at that time 
over incorporation, condemned this formulation as “nebulous.”55 
The Rochin formulation did not have much impact on later case 
outcomes in the search context.56  But, beyond that, the formulation 
itself was subtly altered in later years so as to minimize its subjective 
potential.57  In Rochin, the formulation suggested universal 
application—Justice Frankfurter described due process as protecting 
the “decencies of civilized conduct.”58  In contrast, in Collins v. City of 
Harker Heights, Justice Stevens, for a unanimous Court, held that a 
city’s failure to warn its employees about known hazards in the 
workplace did not violate the Due Process Clause by referring to 
“conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.”59  And in Sacramento 
v. Lewis, Justice Souter further limited the universal sense of 
conscience to shocking the “contemporary conscience.”60 
In contrast, in Commonwealth v. Bricker, in 1990, Justice Cappy 
wrote for a closely-divided majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
 
52 See id. at 1288. 
53 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
54 Id. 
55 See id. at 175 (Black, J., concurring) (“I believe that faithful adherence to the specific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights insures a more permanent protection of individual liberty than 
that which can be afforded by the nebulous standards stated by the majority.”). 
56 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985) (avoiding the Due Process Clause altogether, 
resting condemnation of the search in that case on an incorporated Fourth Amendment); 
Schumber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760 (1966) (distinguishing from Rochin); Breithaupt v. 
Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957) (stating that this case is not comparable to the facts in Rochin). 
57 See Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998); Collins v. City of Harker 
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992). 
58 See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173. 
59 Collins, 503 U.S. at 128. 
60 See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8.  Nor was this concern really new.  Even in Rochin itself, 
Justice Frankfurter had been at pains to deny that he was engaging in “a revival of ‘natural 
law.’”  Rochin, 342 U.S. at 171. 
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Court that the decision of a trial judge to send plea agreements with 
prosecution witnesses out with the jury represented “impermissible 
vouching” for the witnesses that “offends our sense of decency and 
our notion of the fundamental fairness inherent in our judicial 
system.”61  Unlike the Rochin line of cases, Justice Cappy did not feel 
the need to justify this formulation or ward off charges of abusive 
subjectivity.62  Justice Flaherty wrote a vociferous dissent, calling the 
conclusion about the documents “absurd,” but did not suggest that 
the very idea of offending a sense of decency was an impermissibly 
subjective formulation.63 
Nor has that concern with subjectivity been raised since.  In 2002, 
in Commonwealth v. Miller, in a case that rejected another 
impermissible-bolstering claim, both the majority opinion and the 
dissent referred to the Bricker “offends our sense of decency” 
language without any suggestion that this kind of formulation is in 
any way troubling.64  The constant concern about the impermissible 
potential for subjective judgment is simply not a part of Pennsylvania 
constitutional jurisprudence. 
This point can be extended to the nature of rights themselves.  At 
one time, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,65 Justice Douglas for the U.S. 
Supreme Court could unselfconsciously refer to procreation as “one of 
the basic civil rights of man.”66  Given the decline in the rhetoric of 
“inherent rights” on the U.S. Supreme Court in recent years,67 
however, it seems unlikely that any Justice would have the 
confidence to utilize such a formulation today. 
Again, that is not the case with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  
In a special concurrence to his own majority opinion in 
Commonwealth v. Ball,68 Justice Wecht referred to the rights of 
criminal defendants as “preexisting inherent rights that Americans 
enjoy, and that our constitutions obligate us to protect.”69  Not one 
justice presumed to criticize this formulation as a mere subjective 
 
61 Commonwealth v. Bricker, 581 A.2d 147, 155 (Pa. 1990). 
62 See id. 
63 See id. at 161 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
64 See Commonwealth v. Miller, 819 A.2d 504, 515, 521 (Pa. 2002) (Zappala, C.J., dissenting) 
(quoting Bricker, 581 A.2d at 154–55). 
65 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
66 See id. at 541. 
67 The references tend now to be only in quotations from other sources.  See Murphy v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1472 (2018) (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n 
v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 232 (3d Cir. 2013); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 691 
(1990) (quoting 1 Op. Sol. 699, 699 (Dep’t of Interior 1936)). 
68 Commonwealth v. Ball, 146 A.3d 755 (Pa. 2016). 
69 See id. at 771 (Wecht, J., concurring). 
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political, moral judgment.70 
It might be said that Justice Wecht was, after all, merely echoing 
the text of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which describes the rights 
it includes as “inherent and indefeasible.”71  But this is basically true 
of the U.S. Constitution as well, as the Ninth Amendment shows.72  
The Framers of the Revolutionary Period and the subsequent 
constitutional period were not value skeptics.73  It is no more 
appropriate for a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court to disparage 
rights as merely subjective than it is for a justice on the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court to do so.  Value skepticism is not faithful to the 
original public meaning of either Constitution.74  Nor is it consistent 
with our traditions.75 
It might also be said that all of the examples I have adverted to are 
just rhetorical differences—that I am merely pointing to the differing 
ways that the two constitutional traditions talk about law.  I have not 
shown that case outcomes differ between the two courts. 
That is so.  However, law is in large part a rhetorical exercise.  A 
court that insists that political and moral judgments are inherently 
subjective and that values cannot be reasoned about is enunciating a 
different kind of law than is a court that expresses values openly and 
endeavors to defend its judgments as rationally compelling.76 
Nevertheless, there is one substantive area in which value 
engagement seems to have led to a different result in the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court compared to the U.S. Supreme Court: 
voter ID legislation.  In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,77 
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Indiana’s voter ID law.78  There was 
 
70 See id. (Baer, J., dissenting). 
71 See PA. CONST. art. I, §1. 
72 “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
73 See Ledewitz, When Values Died in American Law, supra note 14, at 136. 
74 See Ledewitz, Supreme Court Nomination Process, supra note 19, at 15–17. 
75 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 872 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
76 Compare McDonald, 561 U.S. at 804 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A historically focused 
method] is less subjective because it depends upon a body of evidence susceptible of reasoned 
analysis rather than a variety of vague ethico-political First Principles whose combined 
conclusion can be found to point in any direction the judges favor.  In the most controversial 
matters brought before this Court—for example, the constitutionality of prohibiting abortion, 
assisted suicide, or homosexual sodomy, or the constitutionality of the death penalty—any 
historical methodology, under any plausible standard of proof, would lead to the same 
conclusion.”), with Commonwealth v. Bricker, 581 A.2d 147, 155 (Pa. 1990) (“This 
impermissible vouching for witnesses-especially witnesses of this caliber-offends our sense of 
decency and our notion of the fundamental fairness inherent in our judicial system.”). 
77 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
78 Id. at 188–89, 204 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)). 
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no majority opinion, but neither Justice Stevens’ lead opinion, nor 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence, evinced much, if any, sympathy or 
concern for voters who might be disenfranchised by such a law.79 
In contrast to this indifference, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
in Applewhite v. Commonwealth,80 although remanding the case for 
further consideration of injunctive relief, noted that the “population 
[affected] includes members of some of the most vulnerable segments 
of our society (the elderly, disabled members of our community, and 
the financially disadvantaged.)”81  The court then “obliged” the lower 
court to enter the injunction on remand unless “there will be no voter 
disenfranchisement.”82  Not surprisingly, given that exacting 
standard, a preliminary injunction against the law was granted two 
weeks later.83 
A different context of values expression—a substantive one in 
which there is no parallel to U.S. Supreme Court holdings—is the 
enforcement of environmental rights.84  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s recent decisions interpreting and applying the 
Environmental Rights Provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution85 
have demonstrated strong and confident value commitments.86   
The text of the Environmental Rights Provision, adopted by the 
voters in 1971, under the influence of the original Earth Day87 is 
remarkable in its sweeping breadth: 
 
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the 
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic 
values of the environment.  Pennsylvania’s public natural 
resources are the common property of all the people, including 
 
79 See Bruce Ledewitz, Beyond Edmunds: The State Constitutional Legacy of Chief Justice 
Ronald D. Castille, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 371, 398–99 (2015) [hereinafter Ledewitz, Beyond 
Edmunds]. 
80 Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012). 
81 Id. at 4, 5. 
82 See id. at 5. 
83 See Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2012 WL 4497211, at *8 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct.  Oct. 2, 2012). 
84 See John C. Dernbach & Marc Prokopchak, Recognition of Environmental Rights for 
Pennsylvania Citizens: A Tribute to Chief Justice Castille, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 335, 337 (2015); 
Caleb Hall, A Right Most Dear: The Case for A Constitutional Environmental Right, 30 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 85, 101 (2016). 
85 PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
86 See, e.g., Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017); Robinson 
Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 966–67 (Pa. 2013). 
87 See Donna Morelli, PA’s Environmental Rights Amendment Grows Some Teeth, BAY J. 
(Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.bayjournal.com/article/pa_activists_using_environmental_rights_ 
amendment_with_success.  For background on the adoption, see Dernbach & Prokopchak, 
supra note 84, at 335–36. 
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generations yet to come.  As trustee of these resources, the 
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the 
benefit of all the people.88 
 
Yet, perhaps for the very reason that the text is so broad, the 
Pennsylvania courts failed to enforce the Amendment meaningfully 
for almost forty-five years.89  Two decisions in particular essentially 
precluded successful lawsuits under Section 27: Commonwealth v. 
National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,90 and Payne v. Kassab.91 
In Gettysburg, the Attorney General brought suit to enjoin 
construction of a tower on private land overlooking the Gettysburg 
National Military Park.92  The Attorney General argued that 
construction of the tower would conflict with the right of the people 
to the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the 
environment.93  The court affirmed the denial of the injunction 
below.94 
Although there was no majority opinion, the prospect of an 
unlimited power in the executive branch to enforce undefined 
environmental limits on private parties plainly concerned some of the 
justices.95  Gettysburg has had the effect of precluding enforcement of 
Section 27 against private parties.96 
Conversely, Payne concerned not the reach of the first sentence in 
Section 27, but the meaning of the State’s duty as trustee toward 
Pennsylvania’s “public natural resources.”97  The case involved the 
loss of park land to a street widening project.98  In permitting the 
project to go forward, the Commonwealth Court adopted a three-part 
test of compliance with Section 27 that would generally be satisfied 
if the government followed existing statutory provisions: 
 
(1) Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and 
regulations relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth’s 
public natural resources?  (2) Does the record demonstrate a 
 
88 Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 84, at 336–37. 
89 See id. at 338–39, 344. 
90 Commonwealth v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973). 
91 Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976). 
92 See Gettysburg, 311 A.2d at 589–90. 
93 See id. at 590. 
94 See id. at 595. 
95 See Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 84, at 340. 
96 See id. at 341. 
97 See Payne, 312 A.2d at 272–73; Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 84, at 341. 
98 See Payne, 312 A.2d at 264, 266. 
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reasonable effort to reduce the environmental incursion to a 
minimum?  (3) Does the environmental harm which will result 
from the challenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the 
benefits to be derived therefrom that to proceed further would 
be an abuse of discretion?99 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the denial of injunctive 
relief, holding that compliance with the existing statutory framework 
was sufficient in the context of the street widening without adopting 
the Commonwealth Court test.100  Nevertheless, over the next forty-
five years, the Payne test enunciated in the lower court became the 
standard by which all Section 27 challenges were evaluated, 
resulting in an “almost non-existent” chance of success in enforcing 
Section 27.101 
This entire edifice was overturned, first in a plurality opinion, 
Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, in 2013,102 and then in a 
majority opinion in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation 
v. Commonwealth, (“PEDF”) which adopted the Robinson framework 
for analysis103 and formally rejected the Payne test.104  In Robinson, 
the court struck down important portions of Pennsylvania’s newly 
enacted gas drilling legislation, Act 13.105  In PEDF, the court applied 
the principles of trust doctrine in holding that proceeds from public 
leases of oil and gas interests have to remain within the corpus of the 
public trust created by Section 27.106 
These two decisions are massive in size107 and significance108 and 
 
99 See id. at 273 n.23 (quoting Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), 
aff’d, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976)). 
100 See Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 84, at 342–43. 
101 See id. at 344–45.  Ironically, one exception to this observation was Pennsylvania 
Environmental Management Services v. Commonwealth, in which the court concluded that 
there had been too much concern for environmental protection by the government agency.  Pa. 
Envtl. Mgmt. Servs. v. Commonwealth, 503 A.2d 477, 480 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986). 
102 See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 966–67 (Pa. 2013). 
103 See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 930 (Pa. 2017) (“[W]e rely 
here upon the statement of [general] principles thoughtfully developed in that plurality 
opinion.”). 
104 See id. (citing Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 967). 
105 See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 913, 985. 
106 See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 916. 
107 The plurality opinion in Robinson is 162 pages in length, for example.  See Robinson, 83 
A.3d 901; Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 84, at 351. 
108 John Dernbach was not exaggerating when he wrote in the Widener Environmental Law 
Center blog that “[t]he implications of [the Robinson decision] will be felt for years, perhaps 
decades.”  See John Dernbach, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Robinson Township Decision: 
A Step Back for Marcellus Shale, a Step Forward for Environmental Rights and the Public 
Trust, WIDENER ENVTL. L. CTR. (Dec. 21, 2013), http://blogs.law.widener.edu/envirolawcenter/2 
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analyzing them is beyond my purpose here.  The point here is to see 
these decisions as openly value laden.  In one sense, that is obvious.  
These decisions are milestones in the history of environmental 
protection in the United States.109  But in another sense, the matter 
is not clear at all.  The PEDF court, for example, stated that “the 
proper standard of judicial review lies in the text of Article I, Section 
27 itself.”110  In other words, the Justices would assert that the values 
being enforced in these decisions are simply those of the 
constitutional provision itself and any judge should be enforcing that 
provision as written, no matter how value skeptical. 
There is some merit to this understanding, and I will return below 
to the role of amendments like Section 27 in the development of 
Pennsylvania constitutional jurisprudence.  But this judicial modesty 
would also be disingenuous.  The mere fact that the revolutionary 
implications of Section 27 were held dormant for over forty years111 
shows that a judicial decision was made to break with that line of 
precedent and to read the Amendment afresh. 
The decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court over these two 
opinions to give a fuller effect to the text and implications of Section 
27 cannot be considered a mechanical application of a text.  This 
decision by the justices is reminiscent of the 19th century decision by 
Chancellor George Wythe in Virginia and the earlier decision by 
Chief Judge William Cushing in Massachusetts, to interpret “free 
and equal” clauses in their state constitutions as abolishing 
slavery.112  Yes, it could be said that these jurists were “just” applying 
a constitutional text—if all men are born free and equal, then chattel 
slavery is obviously unconstitutional—but most judges did not 
interpret these constitutional texts to overturn the settled social/
economic arrangements of slavery and it required strong personal 
commitments for these two jurists to do so.113  The same is true for 
the justices who wrote and joined the Robinson and PEDF opinions.  
The value of protecting the environment in ways heretofore 
 
013/12/21/the-pennsylvania-supreme-courts-robinson-township-decision-a-step-back-for-
marcellus-shale-a-step-forward-for-article-i-section-27/.  Now that the Robinson plurality 
opinion has essentially been adopted by the whole court, that significance is only magnified.  
See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 930; Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 84, at 338, 
352, 358–59. 
109 See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 930; Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 84, at 
358–59; Dernbach, supra note 108. 
110 Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 930. 
111 See Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 84, at 338–39, 344. 
112 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 81, 81 n.584 
(1993). 
113 See id. at 81. 
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unexpressed was clearly present. 
The final instance of Pennsylvania constitutional values 
engagement that I will show is perhaps the most explicit, but also the 
most fraught.  In Commonwealth v. Edmunds,114 the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court expressly adopted a four-factor test to be used “each 
time a provision of [the Pennsylvania Constitution] is implicated.”115  
The four factors were described as: 
 
1) text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision; 
2) history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case-law; 
3) related case-law from other states; 
4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state and local 
concern, and applicability within modern Pennsylvania 
jurisprudence.116 
 
There has been some question as to whether the Edmunds 
framework is really applicable “each time” the Pennsylvania 
Constitution is invoked, or only when considering provisions parallel 
to those of the U.S. Constitution, whether the framework is binding 
on the courts, or only on litigants, and whether the decision of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Michigan v. Long117 “requires” anything of a 
state court in the context referenced in Edmunds, despite the 
statement in the opinion that it does.118  All of these considerations 
are beyond my purpose here.  Here, the point is that the court could, 
without comment or criticism, invoke “policy considerations” as 
something the courts need to be concerned about when interpreting 
constitutional provisions.119  What would Justice Scalia have said 
about that? 
Justice Cappy’s majority opinion did in fact broadly consider policy 
in refusing to follow the recognition in United States v. Leon120 of a 
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule121 under Article I, 
 
114 Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991). 
115 Id. at 894–95. 
116 Id. at 895. 
117 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
118 See Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 894–95 (citing Long, 463 U.S. 1032).  In Edmunds, there was 
only a state ground, which means the adequate and independent state ground doctrine modified 
in Long was irrelevant to the actual decision.  See Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 894. 
119 See id. at 901.  The dissent by Justice McDermott was to the wisdom of the result, and 
even to the need generally for independent constitutional interpretation at the state level.  But 
Justice McDermott did not suggest that considerations of policy are merely subjective.  See id. 
at 908. 
120 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
121 See Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 892. 
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Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.122  The majority was 
concerned that a good faith exception would undermine the strict 
requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
doubted the actual costs of the exclusionary rule itself, was not 
convinced of the need for a good faith exception given a recent 
loosening of the difficulty of establishing probable cause and feared 
that under a good faith exception, magistrates might become “‘rubber 
stamps’” for the police because there would be no negative 
consequences of the issuance of a defective warrant.123 
I am not sure whether Justice Scalia would consider any of these 
particular considerations to be subjective.  The value issue is not so 
much what the majority included within the category of policy as the 
use of the category itself.  The idea that courts should concern 
themselves with policy when determining what the law is would 
presumably strike Justice Scalia as an improper mixing of what the 
law is with what the law ought to be.124  But that was not a 
consideration that occurred to any of the justices when the Edmunds 
formulation was first announced. 
Later, however, in Commonwealth v. Russo,125 that consideration 
did arise.  In Russo, the court adopted the federal open fields search 
doctrine as a matter of Pennsylvania constitutional law.126  In what 
is the only invocation of the fear of subjectivism I know of in 
Pennsylvania constitutional jurisprudence, then-Justice Castille 
limited the fourth Edmunds factor to “public policy considerations 
unique to Pennsylvania.”127  He did this at the suggestion, he wrote, 
of a law review article by then-Justice Saylor, explaining “why 
‘[i]mplementation of a state constitutional value . . . necessarily 
entails a searching, evaluative inquiry’ into genuinely ‘unique state 
sources, content, and context as bases for independent 
interpretation.’”128  If policy were not limited to unique state sources, 
“the tag-line ‘policy’ could metamorphose into cover for a transient 
majority’s implementation of its own personal value system as if it 
 
122 See id. at 903 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 905). 
123 See id. at 901, 904. 
124 See John F. Manning, Classic Revisited: Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 
115 MICH. L. REV. 747, 749 (2017). 
125 Commonwealth v. Russo, 934 A.2d 1199 (Pa. 2007). 
126 See id. at 1213. 
127 See id. at 1212. 
128 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas G. Saylor, Prophylaxis in Modern State 
Constitutionalism: New Judicial Federalism and the Acknowledged, Prophylactic Rule, 59 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 309–11 (2003)). 
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were an organic command.”129 
There is something sadly ironic about this fear of imposition of 
subjectivism if any invocation of policy were rendered without some 
specific textual, historical or other grounding, other than just an 
argument about the value itself.  After all, the author of this caution 
is the same jurist who, in the Applewhite voter ID case above, ignored 
contrary U.S. Supreme Court precedent to ensure that no voter ID 
law could take effect in Pennsylvania unless “vulnerable” populations 
were absolutely protected.130  What was that concern other than a 
moral, political judgment without the slightest support in any unique 
Pennsylvania considerations?  Yet, Justice Castille did not worry in 
Applewhite that his concern for the poor and aged was the result of a 
“personal value system.”131  He plainly considered those concerns 
objectively justified.132 
The Russo episode is not only an anomaly in Pennsylvania 
constitutional jurisprudence, which normally is not subject to the fear 
of subjectivism that so haunts the U.S. Supreme Court.133  Russo is 
also an objective lesson in how easy it is in this culture to express 
value skepticism even though there is reason to think we do not really 
believe that all values are subjective.134  Insofar as lack of faith in the 
rational unfolding of truth has undermined the rule of law, we have 
done this unnecessarily, almost as a bad habit rather than a serious 
conclusion.  If we pay attention to the healthy values engagement 
that still goes on in state courts,135 we will perhaps discover a way 
back to the foundation of a rule of law nationally, once again. 
IV.  STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS A SOURCE OF VALUES 
EXPRESSION 
Although the Edmunds formulation had no precursor in 
Pennsylvania constitutional jurisprudence, its invocation of values 
 
129 Russo, 934 A.2d at 1212. 
130 See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008); Applewhite v. 
Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1, 4–5 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam); Russo, 934 A.2d at 1212. 
131 See Russo, 934 A.2d at 1212; Applewhite, 54 A.3d at 4. 
132 See Applewhite, 54 A.3d at 5. 
133 See Ledewitz, Beyond Edmunds, supra note 79, at 389–90, 393; cf. Paulo Barrozo, 
Reconstructing Constitutional Punishment, 6 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 175, 193 (2014) (explaining 
the Supreme Court’s subjectivism in the context of the Eighth Amendment). 
134 See Christopher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 329, 336 n.42 (2007). 
135 See, e.g., Sacramento Cty. Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n v. County of Sacramento, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 834, 843 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1089 (N.J. 1992); Russo, 934 
A.2d at 1212–13. 
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did have a hidden precursor.  In one of the seminal texts of the New 
Federalism renaissance of state constitutional jurisprudence in the 
1980s,136 Washington State Supreme Court Justice Robert F. Utter 
set forth an Edmunds-like three-factor list of matters to consider in 
interpreting a state constitutional Declarations of Rights: textual 
analysis, intent of the people and current values.137 
Of course, “current” values could be narrowly confined to easily 
determined sources of evidence.138  But that is not what Justice Utter 
had in mind.  To be sure, for Justice Utter, the primary meaning of a 
state constitutional provision was to be determined by the text and 
the intent of the people in enacting it.139  Values were to be utilized 
when the text was ambiguous or the intent of the people obscure.140 
However, Justice Utter also envisioned current values as a kind of 
brake on ancient prejudice.141  He wrote that text and intent might 
be so “inappropriate in light of modern conditions and values” that 
they provide no practical guidance to interpretation.142  Even more 
dramatically, he added that even when text and intent are clear, they 
“may no longer be acceptable to our society.”143 
Utter justified such an expansive approach to constitutional 
interpretation in the usual way.  He endorsed a ‘“living’” constitution 
approach that applies fixed principles to changing conditions.144 
Justice Utter was not insensitive to the criticism that such an 
approach would substitute a judge’s own views for the views of those 
who wrote a state constitutional provision.145  In other words, he 
understood the fear of subjectivism.  Invoking G. Edward White, 
however, Justice Utter argued that the “primary defense against ‘bad 
 
136 See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 SW. L.J. 951, 951–52 
(1982). 
137 Justice Utter originally set forth these considerations in Freedom and Diversity in a 
Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights.  
Justice Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State 
Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491, 508–
21 (1984). 
138 See, e.g., John Wihbey, The Supreme Court, Public Opinion and Decision-Making: 
Research Roundup, JOURNALIST’S RESOURCE (June 28, 2013), https://journalistsresource.org/st 
udies/politics/polarization/research-roundup-supreme-court-public-opinion/ (indicating the 
effectiveness of polling data to measure current values on key social issues in the context of the 
Affordable Care Act). 
139 See Utter, supra note 137, at 492–93. 
140 See id. at 521, 524. 
141 See id. at 521. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 522. 
144 Id. (quoting State ex rel. Linn v. Superior Court for King Cty., 146 P.2d 543, 547 (Wash. 
1944)). 
145 See id. at 522–23. 
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judges’ imposing their personal views” in cases is that immoral or 
unjust interpretations of a constitution would not be “accepted by the 
public” and therefore would not be followed.146  In addition, judges 
have to “give a written justification for their decisions” and this would 
be difficult to do with regard to decisions that do not comport with 
contemporary senses of justice.147  Furthermore, a bad decision will 
“come back to haunt” a court.148 
This understanding of the role of judges rests on a robust notion of 
the foundations of truth.  There is a sense here of Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr.’s teaching “that the arc of the moral universe is long, but it 
bends toward justice.”149  Justice Utter is suggesting that truth has 
power—that it is more persuasive in the end than are falsehoods and 
that the public will see this.150  In addition, Justice Utter is invoking 
the understanding set forth by Lon Fuller in the Hart-Fuller debate 
that it is harder to justify evil actions than good ones.151  There is 
even a nod in Justice Utter’s formulation in the direction of Kant’s 
categorical imperative—that the moral law is what can be 
universally applied.152  All of these unconscious references 
demonstrate a healthy relation of values and truth. 
There is nothing in these considerations that would necessarily be 
limited to state constitutional interpretation.  In the midst of the 
arguments over incorporation and the beginning of the fundamental 
rights revolution in the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Harlan wrote a 
similar justification of judicial invocation of values in interpreting the 
concept of due process: 
 
Due process has not been reduced to any formula . . . . If the 
supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of 
necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one 
where judges have felt free to roam where unguided 
speculation might take them.  The balance of which I speak is 
 
146 Id. at 523. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 524. 
149 Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at the Eleventh Annual Convention of the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (Aug. 16, 1967), in A CALL TO CONSCIENCE 171, 199 
(Clayborne Carson & Kris Shepard eds., 2001). 
150 See Utter, supra note 137, at 523. 
151 “Professor Hart seems to assume that evil aims may have as much coherence and inner 
logic as good ones.  I, for one, refuse to accept that assumption.”  Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and 
Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 636 (1958). 
152 One formulation of the categorical imperative is “[a]ct upon a maxim that can also hold 
as a universal law.”  IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 51 (Mary Gregor trans., 
1991). 
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the balance struck by this country, having regard to what 
history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as 
well as the traditions from which it broke.  That tradition is a 
living thing.  A decision of this Court which radically departs 
from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds 
on what has survived is likely to be sound.  No formula could 
serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and 
restraint.153 
 
But though Justice Harlan could write these words in 1961, he did 
so in a context in which his approach to substantive due process was 
very much subject to challenge, and, as we have seen, is not today the 
view of most of the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court.154  The fear 
of subjectivism is widespread and the notion that anything like 
objective truth, or a “rational process,” can be applied to political or 
moral judgments, which would inevitably include the unenumerated 
rights of substantive due process, has been undermined.155 
Yet, as we have also seen, a fairly robust confidence in values 
remains in Pennsylvania constitutional jurisprudence and, at least 
at the time Justice Utter wrote, in state constitutional interpretation 
generally.156  To what might we attribute this difference between 
federal and state constitutional jurisprudence? 
William Thro correctly describes the key difference between state 
and federal constitutional law in writing that “[s]tate constitutions 
are . . . much more ‘political.’”157  In making this observation, Thro 
was referring specifically to the ease of amendment of state 
constitutions, allowing for more direct expression of the current 
values of the people of a state compared to the difficulty of amending 
the federal constitution.158  This is certainly the case and I will return 
to its implications below.159  But I would like to expand the notion of 
the political and its relation to value expression in state 
constitutional law. 
In the first place, it is not just state constitutions that are more 
political, but state governments themselves, including their judicial 
 
153 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
154 See supra Part II. 
155 See Poe, 367 U.S. at 539–40 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
156 See Utter, supra note 137, at 499–504; supra Part III. 
157 William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: 
The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 602 n.27 (1994). 
158 See id. 
159 See infra note 184 and accompanying text. 
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branches.160  State judges are generally elected, for example, rather 
than appointed, as at the federal level.161  And they generally do not 
serve lifetime tenure, as the federal Article III judges do.162  In 
Pennsylvania, for example, judges are elected in partisan elections to 
ten-year terms and face the voters at that point in retention 
elections.163 
Then, there is the rough and tumble of politics that also affects how 
state courts work.  One need only consider recent events in West 
Virginia, in which the entire State Supreme Court faced 
impeachment and removal and a sort of rump State Supreme Court 
was self-selected in response and ordered a halt in impeachment 
trials.164  Or, going back further, in 1986, voters in California 
removed three justices from the State Supreme Court, including the 
Chief Justice, Rose Bird, in a controversy that included opposition to 
judicial treatment of the death penalty, but may have gone beyond 
that.165 
Events like these do not happen at the federal level and would 
provoke a national constitutional crisis if they did.  Criticism by 
President Trump of judicial decisions, such as the recent episode with 
which this Article began,166 are very mild in comparison. 
But what are the implications of more political institutions in 
terms of the acceptance of values as more than merely matters of 
opinion?  I believe there are two. 
Compared to state courts, the federal courts, and particularly the 
U.S. Supreme Court, are elite institutions.167  The Justices 
 
160 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The History of the Judicial Impairment “Doctrine” and Its 
Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1455 (1992); Thro, supra note 157, at 
602 n.27. 
161 “About 90 percent of the judges on state appellate courts and trial courts of general 
jurisdiction face the voters in some form of election.”  Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, 
Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1217 n.1 (2012). 
162 See id. at 1250; Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-
Stripping Legislation and the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 VA. L. REV. 
839, 862 (2012). 
163 See Driscoll v. Corbett, 69 A.3d 197, 213 (Pa. 2013). 
164 See Doug Criss, The West Virginia House Impeached the Entire State Supreme Court, 
CNN (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/14/politics/west-virginia-supreme-court-
impeach-trnd/index.html; Mark Curtis, New West Virginia Supreme Court Meets Legislature, 
WOWKTV (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.wowktv.com/news/west-virginia/new-wv-supreme-court-
meets-legislature/1690593155. 
165 See Rose Bird Deserved to Be Removed, CHI. TRIBUNE (Nov. 19, 1986), https://www.chicag 
otribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1986-11-19-8603270146-story.html. 
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ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/c4b34f9639e141069c08cf1e3deb6 
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themselves, and their law clerks, are more likely than judges at the 
state level to be the products of national law schools, with all that 
that implies.168  This is the point that Justice Scalia made so 
memorably in Romer v. Evans169: “When the Court takes sides in the 
culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than the villeins—
and more specifically with the Templars, reflecting the views and 
values of the lawyer class from which the Court’s Members are 
drawn.”170 
What Justice Scalia failed to appreciate, however, is that his own 
exaggerated fears of subjectivism, his certainty that values are 
always merely matters of opinion, and his conclusion that there can 
be no reasoning in political and moral matters, are all also the 
product of elite culture.  In a recent book, Sophia Rosenfeld makes 
the point that postmodern theory may not be the reason for the 
decline of popular confidence in truth, because most people have not 
read Richard Rorty.171  But we can assume that this is not the case 
with regard to the Justices and their law clerks, who are undoubtedly 
much more familiar with the skepticism of postmodernity than are 
people at large.172  Insofar as ordinary people retain a kind of common 
sense commitment to moral and political realism,173 it is not 
surprising that state court judges do as well.  We could say generally 
that state judges are epistemologically closer to the people than are 
the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court.174 
Second, there is the more traditional sense in which the state 
courts are more political.175  These judges face the people, either in 
elections to the court or in retention elections or both.176  While 
 
Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 330 (2016); Gil Seinfeld, The 
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455 (2016). 
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judicial elections may often not be very revealing in terms of 
underlying value commitments, that is not always the case.177  The 
2015 judicial election in Pennsylvania involved very clear 
denunciations of partisan gerrymanders by some of the candidates, 
for example.178  And even where such elections involve banal 
invocations of the pieties of the rule of law, there is still, inevitably, 
a closer connection between elected judges and the people than 
between judges appointed for life and the people.179  When you run 
for office, you still hear about the needs and hopes of ordinary folk 
and you have to respond.180 
The ease of amendment of state constitutions also plays a role here.  
As Thro explained above, the ease of amendment means that state 
constitutions express recent popular values much more clearly than 
can the federal constitutional text.181  This undoubtedly emboldens 
state judges to enforce these values vigorously, as occurred in 
enforcement of the Pennsylvania Environmental provision discussed 
above.182 
But the ease of amendment also means that state judges can act 
with more confidence that the judgment of the people will be brought 
to bear on judicial decisions than can any federal judge.183  When 
Justice Harlan writes that decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that 
radically depart from the will of the “country” will not survive, it is 
not immediately clear how a democratic correction is to take place.184   
There is no such doubt at the state level.  Voters in Pennsylvania, 
 
177 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, “High Court Wrongly Elected”: A Public Choice Model of 
Judging and Its Implications for the Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1326 (1997). 
178 Indeed, comments made on the campaign trail formed the basis for motions to recuse 
when gerrymandering was actually challenged in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  See 
Jonathan Lai, Pa. Supreme Court Justice Was Biased in Gerrymandering Case, Republicans 
Say, INQUIRER (Feb. 2, 2018), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/pennsylvania-gerrymanderin 
g-case-republicans-justice-david-wecht-20180202.html. 
179 See Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention on the Politics on Judges’ Voting, 83 
J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 174 (2009). 
180 See id. 
181 See Thro, supra note 157, at 602 n.27. 
182 See supra notes 84–114 and accompanying text.  Of course, such popular expressions can 
embrace bias and bigotry, as well.  See Justin R. Long, State Constitutions as Interactive 
Expressions of Fundamental Values, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1739, 1739 (2010) (examining state 
constitutional amendment barring Oklahoma state judges from considering “legal precepts 
from other nations or cultures.”). 
183 See Thro, supra note 157, at 602 n.27. 
184 Poe v. Ullman, 397, U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  On the other hand, 
Barry Friedman has argued that the American people and Congress have exerted indirect 
influence over the Justices such that public accountability has been maintained despite 
appointment and lifetime tenure.  See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW 
PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 14 (2009). 
HOW STATE COURTS CAN HELP 9/17/2019  12:56 PM 
2018/2019] How State Courts Can Help 1349 
for example, have overturned several decisions of the State Supreme 
Court by constitutional amendment in recent years and the potential 
of doing so lends democratic legitimacy to the decisions of the courts 
even when this power is not exercised.185 
In other words, the rhetoric of the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty,186 whereby value judgments of the courts are seen as 
imposed on the democratic branches of government and must 
therefore be especially justified, is not as much of a problem at the 
state court level.187  So, state judges are freer for a variety of reasons 
to express their values more openly than are federal judges.188 
However, does not the political aspect of state court value 
expression run counter to the issue of the rule of law with which this 
Article began?  Was not President Trump expressing a political 
theme when he criticized an “Obama judge” for reflecting the political 
commitments of his predecessor, who appointed that judge?189 
The problem that threatens the rule of law at the federal level is 
not politics, but value skepticism.  The threat is not that judges 
express deeply held values as they interpret legal materials, but that 
they, and we, assume that there is no more to be said.  Thus, 
Republicans appoint self-proclaimed originalists to the courts, while 
Democrats appoint living constitutionalists, but no one even 
attempts a reasoned justification of either position.190  Moral and 
political judgments are assumed by most participants on both sides 
to be arational.191  In contrast, at the state level, values are more 
likely to be openly expressed and then defended.192  The assumption 
is that truth will emerge over time. 
To put this more directly, when Chief Justice Castille asserts that 
it is the role of a court in protecting the fundamental right to vote to 
be especially attentive to the effect of voting laws on the vulnerable, 
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he is expressing a deeply held value that is not derived from any 
objective legal source.193  He is asserting this as a truth of the 
universe, so to speak.  At that point, we can counter Chief Justice 
Castille by claiming that his value expression is merely personal or 
we can take issue with it and challenge him to show that this value 
is objectively right.  The former route, the route of value skepticism, 
renders a rule of law impossible.  For in the end, all judgments will 
be deemed merely subjective.  The latter course, on the other hand, 
is the one that the rule of law as we have known it, has been built 
upon.194  That is the tradition that is still alive in our state courts.195 
V.  CONCLUSION 
How did the rule of law go from constituting the goal of a law school 
education to become an unattainable ideal, instead?  I suppose many 
people would say that this happened when judges began to express 
their own values, rather than reflecting what the law actually is.196  
That is certainly the conservative critique.197 
That diagnosis, if it were the case, would be comforting because a 
majority of the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court now are self-
proclaimed originalists, who have pledged themselves to law as 
law.198  Therefore, if the conservative critique is correct, we should 
soon recover the rule of law. 
Obviously, that is not going to happen.  The reason for this likely 
failure is that under the very theory of conservative jurisprudence—
that moral and political judgments are inherently subjective—the 
commitments so proudly made by these Justices are themselves 
merely personal judgments.  Since we do not believe in reason, we do 
not trust these proclamations as anything more than disguised power 
plays.  And the same suspicion will be present if Democrats pack the 
Supreme Court sometime in the near future and obtain their own 
majority. 
As surprising as it may seem, the only way back to a rule of law is 
to embrace and express our values openly and to defend them 
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rationally.  That activity still goes on in state constitutional 
jurisprudence.  It is there where we must begin to recover the rule of 
law as a nation.  
 
